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The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in Carter v Canada (AG) decriminalized 
medical aid in dying in certain defined cir-
cumstances. One of those circumstances 
is that the person seeking assistance be an 
“adult.” This article argues that the regu-
latory response to this decision must ap-
proach the idea of “adult” in terms of the 
actual medical-decisional capacity of any 
given individual, and not rely upon age as 
a substitute for capacity. This article surveys 
jurisdictions where minors are included in 
physician-assisted dying regimes, and iden-
tifies what little empirical evidence exists 
regarding requests from minors. The heart 
of the article considers the jurisprudence on 
mature minors and when they are deemed 
to have the right to require the withdrawal 
of, or refuse to receive, life-sustaining treat-
ment, and compares the reasoning in these 
cases with that in Carter. A particular focus 
of this article is on how the jurisprudence 
approaches decisional capacity when the 
individual in question may be particularly 
La décision de la Cour suprême du Canada 
dans Carter v Canada (PG) a décriminal-
isé l’aide médicale à mourir dans certaines 
circonstances définies. Une de ces circon-
stances concerne le statut d’ « adulte » de la 
personne cherchant à obtenir cette aide. Cet 
article soutient que la réponse règlementaire 
à cette décision doit considérer l’idée du 
patient « adulte » sur le plan de la capacité 
décisionnelle de chaque individu, plutôt 
que de se fier à l’âge comme substitut de la 
capacité. Cet article étudie les juridictions 
où les requêtes des mineurs sont incluses 
dans les régimes règlementaires d’aide mé-
dicale à mourir et identifie le peu de don-
nées empiriques qui existent concernant les 
requêtes provenant de mineurs. Au cœur de 
cet article se trouve la jurisprudence sur les 
mineurs matures et les circonstances consi-
dérées comme étant suffisantes pour leur ac-
corder le droit de refuser ou de cesser de re-
cevoir les traitements de maintien de la vie. 
On y retrouve également une comparaison 
du raisonnement de ces décisions au raison-
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vulnerable. It finds that a blanket exclusion 
of mature minors from a physician-assisted 
dying regime likely violates the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and calls 
out for considered debate on these issues in-
stead of forcing a minor and their family to 
bring the issues forward through litigation.
nement dans Carter. Dans cet article, une 
attention particulière est portée à l’approche 
de la jurisprudence concernant la détermina-
tion de la capacité décisionnelle d’un indi-
vidu lorsque celui-ci peut être particulière-
ment vulnérable. Enfin, cet article constate 
qu’une exclusion généralisée des mineurs 
matures dans le régime règlementaire d’aide 
médicale à mourir est probablement con-
traire à la Charte canadienne des droits et 
libertés et conclut à la nécessité d’un dé-
bat de qualité sur ces problèmes au lieu de 
forcer un mineur et sa famille à mettre ces 
enjeux de l’avant au moyen de procédures 
judiciaires.
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introduction
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Carter v Canada (AG) 
(Carter SCC) de-criminalized physician-assisted death in certain defined 
circumstances.1 The court was not asked, directly, to consider the situation 
of requests from mature minors.  In this paper, I draw upon the leading deci-
sion concerning the rights of mature minors to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment as a touchstone for considering whether the reasons in Carter SCC 
are persuasive in the context of minors. In particular, I draw upon Justice 
Abella’s reasons in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in AC v Mani-
toba (Director of Child and Family Services).2 In AC, the court had to assess 
what weight should be placed upon a minor’s express refusal to consent to a 
blood transfusion, without which she was expected to die. The focus in AC, 
like that in Carter SCC, was determining the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms3 compliance of a regime that was enacted to address med-
ical decision making in situations where the subject of the decision may be 
vulnerable. Both cases involved fact situations where the requested medical 
treatment decision was expected to result in the death of the requestor. In 
each case, the conclusion about Charter compliance turned on whether the 
regime had mechanisms for considering whether the individual may not, in 
fact, be vulnerable. After closely comparing these cases, I ultimately con-
clude that the blanket exclusion of mature minors from a physician-assisted 
dying regime likely violates Section 7 of the Charter. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Part I, below, I flesh out aspects 
of the Carter SCC decision, and its use of the term “adult” as a descrip-
tive criterion for the Criminal Code4 exemptions. I also survey data on re-
quests from minors in permissive regimes. In Part II, I canvass the recom-
mendations, conclusions, and actions of various bodies that were struck to 
consider medical aid in dying in Canada, for their approaches to requests 
from minors. I then, in Part III, survey provincial statutory regimes and their 
interaction with the common law to illustrate how the capacity of minors to 
make medical treatment decisions is assessed and weighed for the purpose 
of consent to, and refusal of, treatment. Next, in Part IV, I turn to the Carter 
1 2015 SCC 5 at para 147, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter SCC].
2 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181 [AC].
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
4 RSC 1985, c C-46.
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decisions at both the trial level and at the Supreme Court of Canada to con-
sider whether some of the principles and arguments that led to the Supreme 
Court carving out the declaration are persuasive in the context of mature 
minors. Finally, in Part V, I offer a brief discussion of the legal regimes 
which have mechanisms for considering requests for medical aid in dying 
from minors and the safeguards which they have put in place.
i. the Carter decision and Mature Minors
The Carter case specifically considered whether two provisions of the 
Criminal Code offended the Charter. These provisions were subsection 
241(b), which makes aiding or abetting a person to commit suicide an in-
dictable offense, and section 14, which states that consent to death does not 
affect criminal responsibility for causing death.5 The court found that the 
Criminal Code provisions violated all aspects of Section 7 of the Charter. 
Section 7 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice.”6 The prohibition was found to 
deprive some persons of life, because it resulted in individuals taking their 
own lives prematurely, out of fear that they would be physically incapable 
of doing so without assistance when their situation became intolerable to 
them. The right to liberty was violated because the prohibition denied indi-
viduals the right to make decisions about their bodily integrity and medical 
care. Security of the person was also violated because the prohibition left 
some individuals to endure intolerable suffering. These infringements were 
found not to be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
This was because the objective of the Criminal Code prohibition was not 
to preserve life, regardless of the circumstances, but to protect vulnerable 
persons from being induced, at a moment of weakness, to commit suicide. 
However, the prohibition impacted not only this identified group, but also 
the rights of those who were not in fact vulnerable. 
The conclusion that the prohibition was not saved by Section 17 simi-
larly turned on the prohibition’s blanket character. In particular, the prohibi-
5 Ibid.
6 Charter, supra note 3.
7 Ibid, s 1. Section 1 imposes limits on Charter rights. In particular, it states that 
“[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
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tion was not proportionate to the law’s objective because a blanket prohibi-
tion was not necessary to protect the vulnerable. This conclusion turned on 
evidence that physicians are able to assess vulnerability and already do so 
when assessing decisional capacity and informed consent in the context of 
medical decision making. It also turned on evidence regarding how other 
countries have developed physician-assisted dying regimes with safeguards 
for protecting vulnerable persons.
The court declared the Criminal Code provisions of no force and effect: 
to the extent that they prohibit physician-assisted death for a 
competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the ter-
mination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable med-
ical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that 
causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual 
in the circumstances.8 
This declaration reads down Criminal Code offences that would otherwise 
be triggered by physician-assisted death. The declaration’s requirement that 
the requesting person be an adult creates challenges. The term “adult” is not 
defined in Carter SCC. In some legislation regarding medical-decisional 
capacity, the term “adult” is defined to align with the age of majority and 
is further defined as creating a presumption of capacity.9 However, persons 
under the age of majority, or minors, may also have decisional capacity. 
In some provinces, the presumption of capacity is legislatively granted to 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” In determin-
ing whether a rights-infringing law is saved by this limitation, courts apply 
a test which was identified in R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103. The court will 
first ask whether the law’s goal has a “pressing and substantial” objective. If 
so, the court then conducts a proportionality analysis, which assesses whether 
the law’s limitation on a Charter right is rationally connected to its purpose, 
whether the law minimally impairs the right in question, and whether there is 
proportionality between the benefits of the limit and its deleterious effects. 
8 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 147.
9 See e.g. Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, RSBC 
1996, c 181. Section 1 defines “adult” as “anyone who has reached 19 years of 
age,” and section 3 states that anyone who is an adult is presumed to be capable 
of “giving, refusing or revoking consent to health care” (ibid, s 3(1)(a)).
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minors aged 16 and 17.10 In most provincial regimes, factors relating to a 
minor’s actual decisional capacity play a significant role in determining the 
weight to be assigned to their wishes for medical treatment including refusal 
of life-sustaining care, and the concept of a “mature minor” 11 is used. Regu-
latory reform in response to Carter SCC does not reflect these regimes. In-
stead, it imports an age limit, 18, as a threshold criteria for eligibility.12 As a 
result, a physician would not be criminally liable for granting a request from 
a mature minor to withdraw life-saving treatment but would potentially face 
a murder charge and sentence of life in prison if a physician agreed to grant 
such a youth a request to administer a lethal medication13 in a context where 
the other elements of the declaration are present. On its face, this seems to 
be an incongruous and arbitrary outcome that requires closer scrutiny.
There is no evidence to suggest that the court was asked to consider 
requests from mature minors, or the consistency of the prohibitions with the 
rights of mature minors. Rather, from reviewing the trial decision, it seems 
the legal questions revolved around how the Criminal Code prohibitions 
were inconsistent with the Charter rights of the particular plaintiffs – none 
of whom were minors. The evidence and arguments concerning regimes 
that permit physician-assisted death, and how those regimes address co-
ercion, comprehension, and capacity, similarly did not consider how such 
regimes approach requests from minors.14 It is appropriate that the court did 
not extend its declaration beyond the legal questions that were expressly 
argued and the evidentiary record before it. However, given that all Can-
adian jurisdictions recognize mature minors as having full or qualified 
rights to make medical treatment decisions, including withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, it is disappointing that the court did not flag the need 
for policy-makers to engage with the question of how these rights will have 
to be reconciled with the Carter SCC declaration. 
10 See Medical Consent of Minors Act, SNB 1976, c M-6.1, s 2; The Health Care 
Directives Act, SM 1992, c 33, CCSM c H27, s 4(2)(a) [Directives, Manitoba]. 
11 The concept of a “mature minor” is explained in Part IV, below.
12 An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other 
Acts (medical assistance in dying) SC 2016, c 3, amending supra note 4, s 
241.2(1)(b).
13 Criminal Code, supra note 4, ss 229, 231, 235. For a concise discussion of 
terminology related to assisted death, see Carter v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 
886 at paras 36–43, 218 ACWS (3d) 824 [Carter BCSC].
14 Carter BCSC, supra note 13.
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There is scant empirical evidence on minors’ requests for physician-
assisted death in general,15 let alone in Canada. One of the few studies on 
minors’ requests for physician-assisted dying that included Canadian data 
took place in 1997. It involved sending confidential surveys to all members 
of the American Society of Clinical Oncologists located in Canada, the US, 
and the UK. A total of 228 pediatric oncologists (or 55% of the pediatric on-
cologist membership at the time) took part in the survey.16 Unfortunately the 
responses are not reported by country, but rather are merged in the survey’s 
findings. According to the survey, 20.1% of pediatric oncologists reported 
receiving between 1 to 10 requests for physician-assisted suicide during the 
course of their careers. Moreover, 26.1% reported receiving requests for 
euthanasia.17 The survey revealed that in some instances pediatric oncolo-
gists complied with these requests: 4.2% reported having provided a pre-
scription to enable assisted death on 1 to 10 occasions, and 8.6% reported 
having performed euthanasia for between one to five patients.18 Though this 
data set is small, and old, it would seem to suggest that Canadian physicians 
likely already receive and may grant such requests – despite the granting 
of these requests being unlawful. Regardless of the limits of what one can 
conclude from this study, it is simply naïve to assume that minors will not 
make such requests now that the Criminal Code has been amended to permit 
requests for medical aid in dying from adults.
While the number of requests from minors is extremely small even 
in  jurisdictions where minors are included in physician-assisted dying 
regimes,19 the numbers do not undermine the importance of fulsomely con-
15 Bernard Dan, Christine Fonteyne & Stéphan Clément de Cléty, “Self-Re-
quested Euthanasia for Children in Belgium” (2014) 383:9918 Lancet 671 at 
671. The authors note that there is little reliable data that has been collected on 
requests from minors.
16 Joanne Hilden et al, “Attitudes and Practices among Pediatric Oncologists Re-
garding End-of-Life Care: Results of the 1998 American Society of Clinical 
Oncology Survey” (2001) 19:1 J Clin Oncol 205 at 205.
17 Ibid at 208. The authors of the report caution that those pediatric oncologists 
who indicated they had performed euthanasia were also almost all willing to 
use high-dose opioids to control pain, and may have “believed that adequate 
pain control in those cases was the equivalent of euthanasia” (ibid at 210).
18 Ibid at 208.
19 A study on pediatric end-of-life decisions in the Netherlands inquired into 129 
reported deaths of children between the ages of 1 and 17, over a four-month 
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sidering whether the Carter SCC exemptions ought to be, or legally must 
be, extended to mature minors before we are faced with the foreseeable 
situation of a mature minor seeking certainty on the issue. To wait and force 
a minor to put themselves forward and live out this test case role, in a situa-
tion where the minor otherwise meets the onerous Carter SCC criteria of 
living with a grievous and irremediable medical condition that causes in-
tolerable and enduring suffering, is cruel. This paper is intended to contrib-
ute to this foreseeable conversation. 
ii. reports on Medically assisted death and children, and 
legislative responses
There have been three national reports in Canada on physician-assisted 
death and several reports submitted to or commissioned by the Québec gov-
ernment. The first national report was prepared by the Special Senate Com-
mittee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, which submitted its report to 
Parliament in 1995. Their mandate was “to examine and report on the legal, 
social, and ethical issues relating to euthanasia and assisted suicide” so as to 
support Parliament engaging in a “full and open national debate” on these 
matters.20 Despite the breadth of this mandate, the report was utterly silent 
on the situation of minors. Given that the Committee recommended that 
even for competent adults assisted suicide and euthanasia should remain 
prohibited, it is likely that they thought it unnecessary to engage with the 
more complex issue of mature minors.
Fifteen years later, in 2010, the public policy questions were revisited 
by an Expert Panel of the Royal Society of Canada. This Panel discussed the 
situation of mature minors in the debate on assisted suicide and euthanasia. 
period. The study revealed that 0.7% of the deaths followed a request made by 
a minor to the physician to administer drugs to hasten death. Astrid Vrakking 
et al, “Medical End-of-Life Decisions for Children in the Netherlands” (2005) 
159:9 Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 802 at 804 [Vrakking et al, “Medical End-of-
Life Decisions”]. Belgian pediatricians predicted that the number of requests 
from minors would be quite small. See Linda Pressly, “Belgium Divided on 
Euthanasia for Children”, BBC News (9 January 2014), online: BBC <www.
bbc.com/news/magazine-25651758>.
20 Parliament of Canada, The Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and As-
sisted Suicide, Of Life and Death – Final Report (June 1995), online: Parlia-
ment of Canada < www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/351/euth/rep/lad-e.
htm>. 
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The Panel referred to a number of legal sources as relevant for determining 
the legal situation of mature minors, including “the common law mature 
minor rule, the courts’ overall jurisdiction to protect the vulnerable, prov-
incial/territorial child and family services legislation, provincial/territorial 
consent legislation, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”21 
as well as the jurisprudence interpreting these various instruments and doc-
trines. The Panel observed that given the unclear interaction between the 
above instruments and doctrines, as well as controversy surrounding the in-
struments/doctrines themselves, the law on mature minors remains an area 
of confusion.22 Regardless, the Panel ultimately reached a straight-forward 
recommendation – that the law on mature minors for making medical treat-
ment decisions should apply to decisions about assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia. However, they also noted that this solution required provincial and 
territorial governments to clarify mature minor consent law for end-of-life 
decision making through their consent and child protection legislation.23
Provinces and territories never acted on either recommendation. As 
will be discussed below, we continue to have a patchwork of legislation 
for assessing and giving weight to the decisional capacity of mature minors 
generally, although there are some commonalities. As well, no provincial 
or territorial government appears to have considered whether or with what 
modifications the law on mature minors applies (or should apply) to assisted 
death, with the exception of Québec.  As the only province to enact phys-
ician-assisted death legislation, Québec declined to authorize physician-
assisted death for mature minors.24 This decision ran contrary to the explicit 
recommendations of Québec’s Commission des droits de la personne et des 
droits de la jeunesse. The Commission found both that the absolute exclu-
21 The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel, End-of-Life Decision-Making in 
Canada (Ottawa: November 2011) at 32 [footnotes omitted]. 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid at 92.
24 An expert panel provided a review for Québec and surveyed the law on minors. 
While it identified the right of children over 14 with capacity to make medical 
treatment decisions, it did not make a recommendation about whether to extend 
the regime to minors. Québec, Comité de juristes experts, Mettre en oeuvre 
les recommandations de la Commission spéciale de l’Assemblée nationale sur 
la question de mourir dans la dignité : rapport du comité de juristes experts 
(January 2013), online: Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux <www.
msss.gouv.qc.ca/documentation/salle-de-presse/medias/rapport_comite_jurist 
es_experts.pdf>. 
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sion of minors from the regime violated their rights, and that this rights 
violation could not likely be justified. The Commission wrote: 
Les balises qui rendent inaccessible l’aide médicale à mourir 
aux personnes mineures risquent de porter atteinte à leurs lib-
ertés et droits fondamentaux en l’occurrence le droit à la vie, 
le droit à l’intégrité, le droit à la sûreté, le droit à la liberté de 
sa personne, la liberté de conscience, le droit à la sauvegarde 
de sa dignité et le droit au respect de sa vie privée. La Com-
mission doute que ces atteintes puissent être sauvegardées en 
vertu de l’article 9.1 de la Charte. Des règles plus en phase 
avec les règles actuelles de consentement aux soins pour les 
personnes mineures, mais qui tiennent compte de caractère 
spécifique et irréversible de l’aide médicale à mourir, seraient 
mieux à même de satisfaire au critère de l’atteinte minimale. 
La Commission invite donc le législateur à ouvrir la possi-
bilité de recourir à l’aide médicale à mourir aux personnes 
mineures, moyennant le développement de mécanismes de 
consentement appropriés.25
The Commission’s recommendation, that the legislative regime for phys-
ician-assisted death be extended to minors, and that the regime identify ap-
propriate mechanisms to determine how requests from mature minors are 
considered, were not acted upon by Québec. 
25 Québec, Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 
Mémoire à la Commission de la santé et des services sociaux de l’Assemblée 
nationale : Project de Loi No 52, Loi concernant les soins de fin de vie (Sep-
tember 2013) at 22, online: <www.cdpdj.qc.ca/publications/memoire_PL52_
soins-fin-de-vie.pdf> [Mémoire, Projet de loi No 52]. An unofficial translation 
of this passage, provided by Brenna Noble, is: 
The rules that render medical aid in dying unattainable to min-
ors may jeopardize their fundamental rights and freedoms in 
this case the right to life, the right to integrity, the right to secur-
ity, the right to liberty, one’s freedom of conscience, the right 
to the safeguard of one’s dignity, and the right to privacy. The 
Commission doubts that such attacks can be saved under sec-
tion 9.1 of the Charter. Rules more in line with the current rules 
of consent to care for minors, but that take the specific and ir-
reversible nature of medical aid in dying into account, would be 
better able to satisfy the minimal impairment test. The Commis-
sion therefore invites the legislature to open the possibility of 
permitting medical aid in dying to minors, through the develop-
ment of appropriate mechanisms to consent.
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Mature minors were also mentioned in proposed charging guidelines for 
exercising prosecutorial discretion in situations of physician-assisted death 
in Canada. This detailed set of guidelines was put forward by two schol-
ars, who published it shortly after the trial judge in Carter struck down the 
Criminal Code prohibitions but suspended the declaration for one year.26 
These guidelines are highly detailed and nuanced. In general, they recom-
mend not prosecuting where the request is an expression of autonomous 
choice and public confidence would not be eroded by a failure to prosecute. 
The authors describe their guidelines as intended to apply to “competent 
adults and minors alike,”27 while noting that decisional capacity for minors 
is determined with regard to their individual level of maturity.28  
Most recently, the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on 
Physician-Assisted Dying issued its Final Report on November 30, 2015.29 
This Advisory Group’s members were appointed by eleven provinces and 
territories, consulted nationally, and were mandated to give non-binding ad-
vice to participating provinces and territories regarding implementation of 
the Carter SCC decision. The group considered the meaning of the refer-
ence to “adult” in Carter SCC. They ultimately recommended that the regu-
latory framework for physician-assisted dying in Canada avoid using an age 
limit and effectively interpreted the reference to “adult” in Carter SCC as 
meaning having competence.30 This recommendation was in part a response 
to requests for a consistent national approach to eligibility, and to recognize 
that age is an arbitrary factor, which does not create a safeguard against risk 
and vulnerability. Instead, the Advisory Group posited that a decision about 
eligibility should turn on “the context of each request to determine whether 
the person has the information needed, is not under coercion or undue pres-
sure, and is competent to make such a decision.”31 
26 Jocelyn Downie & Ben White, “Prosecutorial Discretion in Assisted Dying in 
Canada: A Proposal for Charging Guidelines” (2012) 6:2 McGill JL & Health 
113.
27 Ibid at 134.
28 Ibid at 143. 
29 Online: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care <www.health.gov.
on.ca/en/news/bulletin/2015/docs/eagreport_20151214_en.pdf>. 
30 Ibid at 34.
31 Ibid. 
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A federal panel was also struck to advise on implementing Carter SCC. 
That panel did not make any recommendations. Rather, its deliverable was 
a summary of findings based on public consultations regarding issues raised 
by the Carter decision. The panel received comments from private individ-
uals regarding minors, which reflected mixed support for including minors 
within a physician-assisted dying regime. Comments from medical ethicists, 
a College of Physicians and Surgeons, and legal scholars, on the other hand, 
were consistent in rejecting age as a criterion for access and in supporting a 
capacity-based approach, sometimes in conjunction with a mandatory con-
sultation with parents or legal guardians.32 
The next Part explains the law on minors and medical decision making. 
It illustrates that provinces, like the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory 
Group, have largely recognized that older youth may have competency and 
capacity to make life-and-death medical treatment decisions.
iii. Minors and capacity to Make Medical treatMent decisions
The law treats adults differently than minors in many instances. One of 
the areas of law where their rights differ is the law surrounding consent to 
medical interventions, where without informed consent an intervention may 
constitute an assault.33 Adults are presumed to possess decisional capacity 
to consent to medical treatment. As a result of this presumption, concerns 
about their consent are more likely to turn on questions such as whether the 
adult was sufficiently informed for the consent to be valid.34 This presump-
tion about decisional capacity does not – in most cases – hold for minors.35 
32 Canada, External Panel on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v Can-
ada, Consultations on Physician-Assisted Dying: Summary of Results and Key 
Findings – Final Report (15 December 2015) at 54–55, online: Department of 
Justice <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/pad-amm/pad.pdf>.
33 Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880, 114 DLR 3(d) 1.
34 See e.g. Patricia Peppin, “Informed Consent” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy 
Caulfield & Colleen Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2011) 153 at 153–54 [Downie, Caulfield & 
Flood, 4th ed]. 
35 For a comprehensive discussion of medical decision making in the context of 
minors, including the rights and roles of parents and the thresholds for state 
intervention, see Joan M Gilmour, “Legal Considerations in Paediatric Patient 
and Family-Centred Healthcare” in Randi Zlotnik Shaul, ed, Paediatric Pa-
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In practice, the question of capacity and consent to medical treatment 
for minors usually only becomes relevant where there is some sort of dis-
pute about treatment. For example, a minor may wish to have a treatment, 
such as an abortion, against the wishes of their parents and so the parents 
claim the physician may not lawfully proceed on the basis of the minor’s 
consent alone.36 Alternately, physicians may disagree with the treatment de-
cisions of the minor and/or the minor’s family, and so inform child welfare 
authorities, who in turn make a decision whether or not to seek a court order 
granting authorization to impose treatment.37 The new legislation presents 
a variation on this situation. Indeed, it forces us to contemplate a situation 
where, for example, there is a consensus between the mature minor, their 
family, and their physician that physician-assisted death is an appropriate 
treatment decision.38 However, pursuant to the medical assistance in dying 
legislation, it would be unlawful to grant this treatment choice until the day 
the minor reaches the age of 18.
Why 18? The reasoning behind this age bar being set at 18 is not clear. It 
may be influenced by the fact that the age of majority, when a person ceases 
tient and Family-Centred Care: Ethical and Legal Issues (New York: Springer, 
2014) 115 at 115–21. 
36 An early case in this area considered whether a 16-year-old could consent to 
an abortion, against the wishes of her parents. See C (JS) v Wren, 76 AR 115, 
[1986] 35 DLR (4th) 419 (ABCA). 
37 Many cases in this area have concerned treatment decisions regarding children 
who are Jehovah’s Witnesses. In these cases,  the parents and child rejected 
physician advice to undergo a blood transfusion, despite such a decision ren-
dering recovery unlikely. See e.g. AC, supra note 2; B(SJ) v British Columbia 
(Director of Child, Family and Community Service), 2005 BCSC 573, [2005] 
BCJ No 836; Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v BH, 2002 ABPC 39, [2002] 
AJ No 356 [BH]; U(C) (Next Friend Of) v McGonigle, 2000 ABQB 626, 
[2000] AJ No 1067; Re Kennett Estate v Manitoba (AG), [1998] MJ No 131, 78 
ACWS (3d) 1114 (MBQB); Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v Region 2 Hospi-
tal Corp (1994), 150 NBR (2d) 366, 116 DLR (4th) 477 (NBCA) [Walker].
38 Obviously, other permutations are possible, including one where only the 
mature minor seeks assisted death, and the family and health care team dis-
agree, or one where the dispute is between the parents and the child. See e.g. 
BH, supra note 37, where the parent had consented to a blood transfusion that 
would likely save the life of the minor, but the 16-year-old Jehovah’s Witness 
minor refused. The scenario described in the body of the paper is the one which 
would most likely lead to this issue being litigated.
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being a legal minor, is 18 in six Canadian provinces,39 although it is 19 in 
four provinces and the three territories.40 That being said, the age of majority 
plays a shifting role vis-à-vis the right of minors to consent to other forms 
of medical treatment. Importantly, being a minor – or being below the age 
of majority – is not an absolute bar to a person being recognized as having 
a right to determine their own medical treatments. Both statutory law and 
the common law provide guidance on whether a child can provide consent 
or, in the alternative, whether their parent or guardian presumptively retains 
this authority.41 In some instances statutory law codifies the common law. 
In other instances, it compliments or overrides it.42 As a result, the law on 
consent varies across the country. 
The common law recognizes that while minors are not presumed to have 
decisional capacity, this presumption can be rebutted. The common law ap-
proaches the issue on an individualized basis that focuses on the minor’s 
level of maturity.43 Joan Gilmour summarizes the common law as follows: 
“For children and adolescents who have the capacity to understand infor-
mation and appreciate the consequences of making specific decisions, the 
consensus is that they should make their own treatment decisions.”44 Legis-
39 These provinces are Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Sas-
katchewan, and Québec. See Age of Majority Act, RSA 2000, c A-6, s 1; The 
Age of Majority Act, RSM 1987, c A7, s 1; Age of Majority and Accountability 
Act, RSO 1990, c A.7, s 1; Age of Majority Act, RSPEI 1988, c A-8, s 1; The 
Age of Majority Act, RSS 1978, c A-6, s 2(1); art 153 CCQ.
40 This is the case in British Columbia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon. See Age of Majority Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 7, s 1(a); Age of Majority Act, RSNB 1973, c A-4, s 1(1); Age of 
Majority Act, SNL 1995, c A-4.2, s 2; Age of Majority Act, RSNS 1989, c 4, s 
2(1); Age of Majority Act, RSNWT 1988, c A-2, s 2; Age of Majority Act, RSY 
1986, c 2, s 1(1).
41 B(R) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 
[1994] SCJ No 24.
42 For a summary of the relationship between statutory law and the common law, 
see Joan Gilmour, “Children, Adolescents and Health Care” in Jocelyn Down-
ie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 
2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) 202 at 210–21. 
43 Ibid at 211.
44 Joan Gilmour et al, “Pediatric Use of Complementary and Alternative Medi-
cine: Legal, Ethical, and Clinical Issues in Decision-Making” (2011) 128:S4 
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lation varies across the country in terms of how it interacts with the com-
mon law or otherwise approaches decisional capacity in minors. Manitoba 
and New Brunswick provide examples of jurisdictions where legislation has 
deemed an age less than majority as the age at which a child is presump-
tively recognized as having decisional capacity for medical treatment deci-
sions. In these provinces, children 16 years of age and older are presumed 
to have capacity,45 and thus can consent to medical treatment, including the 
withdrawal from or refusal of life-sustaining treatment. The Carter SCC 
declaration, with its reference to the patient being an “adult” as a threshold 
criterion, is strikingly at odds with these regimes if “adult” is interpreted 
to mean the age of majority. The new legislation is similarly inconsistent. 
Just as with adults who lack capacity, these laws contemplate the state or 
a third party having discretion to intervene if decisional capacity is in fact 
lacking. For example, the Manitoba legislation permits intervention if the 
16- or 17-year-old minor is unable, in fact, to “understand the information 
that is relevant to making a decision to consent or not consent” to treat-
ment, or is unable “to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences 
of making a decision to consent or not consent” to the medical treatment.46 
The legislation in New Brunswick and Manitoba also addresses the role of a 
minor’s views when the minor is under 16 years of age. In particular, where 
a minor is between 12 and 16, and there is a dispute over treatment, Mani-
toba gives the minor the opportunity to have their opinion heard in a court 
proceeding. The judge may also consider the preferences of a minor under 
the age of 12 if the minor is deemed by the judge to be able to understand 
Pediatrics S149 at S151–52. See also Joan M Gilmour, “Children, Adolescents 
and Health Care”, supra note 42 at 212, where Gilmour similarly writes: “a 
minor who can fully understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a 
proposed medical procedure can give legally valid consent 
to the treatment.” 
45 See Medical Consent of Minors Act, supra note 10, s 17(3); Directives, Mani-
toba, supra note 10, s 4(2)(a). 
46 The Child and Family Services Act, SM 1985–86, CCSM c C80, ss 25(9)(a)–
(b) [Child and Family Services Act]. Two common requirements for consent, 
arising under the common law but reified into legislation in many instances, are 
that the patient have capacity to make the treatment decision and the consent be 
informed. Decisional capacity is defined as being present where “an individual 
has sufficient ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences 
of treatment and its alternatives to be able to make a decision about whether to 
proceed with it or not” (Joan M Gilmour, “Death, Dying and Decision-Making 
about End of Life Care” in Downie, Caulfield & Flood, 4th ed, supra note 34, 
385 at 387–89 [Gilmour, “Death, Dying and Decision-Making”]).
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the proceeding and if the treatment would not be harmful to the minor.47 
New Brunswick permits any child under 16 to give consent if the minor is 
found “capable of understanding the nature and consequences of a medical 
treatment” and the treatment is in “the best interests of the minor and his 
continuing health.”48 Thus for both jurisdictions, minors 16 years of age 
and younger are already recognized as potentially having the capacity and 
right to consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, although this 
right is limited to circumstances where the treatment enables “continuing 
health” or is “not harmful.” On the face of it, medical aid in dying would 
cause the identifiable “harm” of certain death. However, one must bear in 
mind the larger context, and in particular the elements of the declaration, 
and ask whether it is conceivable that there are circumstances in which a 
decision-maker would find that certain death is “not harmful” if the alterna-
tive is to force the minor to experience enduring intolerable suffering. This 
conclusion is all the stronger in light of the legislative regime, which added 
the further requirement that the natural death of the requesting individual be 
reasonably foreseeable.49
The statutory regime in British Columbia, on the other hand, makes 
no reference to age. Unlike New Brunswick and Manitoba, it has adopted 
a capacity approach for all minors. Its terms for a minor’s consent to be 
considered legally effective are twofold. First, the minor must be found to 
understand “the nature and consequences and the reasonably foreseeable 
benefits and risks of the health care.” Second, the health care provider must 
have “made reasonable efforts to determine and [must have] concluded that 
the health care is in the infant’s best interests.”50 Thus the mature minor’s 
decision is not deferred to without a concurring opinion from a physician, 
and unlike New Brunswick, no legal presumption is made that minors 16 
to 18 years of age have decisional capacity. Just as some physicians agreed 
with the patient litigants in Carter SCC that a request for a physician-assist-
ed death ought to be granted to those individuals, it is entirely conceivable 
that a British Columbian physician may concur with a capable minor that 
physician-assisted dying is in their best interests.
47 Child and Family Services Act, supra note 46, ss 2(2)–(3). It was the Manitoba 
regime that was at issue in AC, supra note 2, and so it is returned to again, 
below.
48 Medical Consent of Minors Act, supra note 10, s 3(1)(b). 
49 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s 241.2(2)(d).
50 Infants Act, RSBC 1996, c 223, s 17(3)(a). 
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The scholarship on mature minor regimes often adopts a critical tone, 
taking the position that in refusal of treatment cases, capacity assessments 
may be artificial. Mosoff, for example, notes that where there is a dispute 
about capacity and the matter goes to court, a youth will be found to lack 
capacity if “death is likely without treatment and the treatment is likely to 
be successful.”51 That is, the decision about whether to respect the minor’s 
wishes turns not on the capacity assessment, but on the alignment of the 
prognosis with the minor’s decision. Gilmour surmises that a positive prog-
nosis influences whether a court believes that the minor understands the 
consequences of refusing the treatment, and thus whether the minor has 
capacity.52 
Where minors’ decisions to refuse potentially life-sustaining treatment 
have been assessed in court and respected, the fact situations have indeed 
tended to be ones where the odds of a favourable outcome were low, or the 
child’s life was unlikely to be appreciably prolonged. These poor progno-
ses were often accompanied by undesirable side effects associated with the 
treatment, including emotional distress due to religious beliefs being violat-
ed.53 Despite this pattern, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that – in 
51 See Judith Mosoff, “‘Why Not Tell It Like It Is?’: The Example of P.H. v. East-
ern Regional Integrated Health Authority, a Minor in a Life-Threatening Con-
text” (2012) 63 UNBLJ 238 at 239. See also Gilmour, “Children, Adolescents 
and Health Care”, supra note 42 at 213: 
The argument that a minor can only consent to care that would 
be of benefit is sometimes referred to as ‘the welfare principle’. 
It suggests that a mature minor can only make those decisions 
about medical care that others would consider to be in his or 
her interests; as such it challenges the extent of the commit-
ment in law to mature minors’ interests in self-determination 
and autonomy.
52 Gilmour, “Death, Dying and Decision-Making”, supra note 46 at 392–93. In 
AC¸ supra note 2, Justice Abella noted a similar trend, without going so far as 
to suggest that unspoken factors are at play. In her survey of the jurisprudence 
in 2009, she noted that at that time no court in Canada or the UK had allowed a 
child under 16 to refuse treatment that was likely to jeopardize the child’s “po-
tential for a healthy future” (ibid at paras 56–57). In these cases, courts found 
that the decision to refuse treatment was not voluntary (e.g., due to influence 
from parents) or else that “the [child] was not mature enough to make the deci-
sion to die” (ibid at para 61).
53 AC, supra note 2 at paras 62–63. See also Walker, supra note 37; Re K(LD), 
(1985), 23 CRR 337 at paras 19, 27, 33, ACWS (2d) 417 (Ont Prov Ct); Sas-
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theory – the coupling of Manitoba’s legislation with the common law could 
result in upholding a 15-year-old’s decision to not undergo a life-saving 
treatment despite a good prognosis.54 While the jurisprudence may exhibit 
a certain capriciousness, this is no cause to avoid considering the implica-
tions of Carter SCC for mature minors. Any older adolescent who met the 
remainder of the onerous criteria set out in the Carter SCC declaration and 
the additional statutory requirement – a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable and whose death 
is reasonably foreseeable – would be unlikely to be in a situation where the 
prognosis is favourable. As a result, some of the concerns which Mosoff and 
Gilmour identify would be unlikely to influence the integrity of the capacity 
assessment. In sum, while the tests and criteria vary, all jurisdictions recog-
nize that minors may be sufficiently mature to consent to medical treatment 
including the withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment. In some instances, 
third party affirmation that the decision is in the minor’s best interest is also 
required. 
Recall that the Carter SCC declaration brings the law on physician-
assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia more in line with existing law on 
the determinative role of consent where a person refuses to receive, or with-
draws from, life-sustaining treatment55 – but only for someone who is a 
“competent adult.”56 A pivotal question, then, is whether the medical aid 
in dying regime enacted to implement Carter SCC, and in particular the 
regime’s exclusion of mature minors, would withstand a Charter challenge. 
That is, is the reasoning in Carter SCC persuasive in the case of a ma-
ture minor? I turn now to comparing the Carter SCC decision with Justice 
Abella’s reasons in AC.
katchewan (Minister of Social Services) v P(F), [1990] 69 DLR (4th) 134, 
[1990] 4 WWR 748 (Sask Prov Ct).
54 AC, supra note 2.
55 For an overview of the determinative role of consent in such health care deci-
sions, see Gilmour, “Death, Dying and Decision-Making”, supra note 46 at 
387.
56 Another continuing inconsistency is that substitute decision-makers, and ad-
vance directives, can provide full consent for the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from persons who, at the time when the decision to withdraw is actually 
made, lack capacity. See Personal Directives Act, SNS 2008, c 8, ss 3(b), 9, 15.
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iv. applying the reasoning in Carter to Mature Minors
The legal question in Carter SCC was framed as whether a statutory 
regime which has the “narrow goal of preventing vulnerable persons from 
being induced to commit suicide at a time of weakness”57 was Charter-
compliant. The trial judge, Justice Smith, remarked on similarities between 
the matters before her and the leading case on mature minors’ right to not 
have medical treatment imposed without their consent, AC.58 The discussion 
below will take the majority reasons written by Justice Abella in AC59 as a 
touchstone for considering the persuasiveness of aspects of the Carter SCC 
decision in the context of mature minors. It will focus, in particular, on the 
analysis of the rights that are protected under Section 7 of the Charter. 
AC involved the interaction of the common law with Manitoba’s 
child welfare legislation. A 15-year-old Jehovah’s Witness had refused 
to consent to blood transfusions, a decision that put her life directly at 
risk. The minor’s family supported this decision. The Manitoba Director 
of Child and Family Services intervened and sought a court order under 
provincial legislation to authorize the life-saving treatment without the 
consent of the minor and/or her family. As the minor was under 16, the 
legislative presumption of capacity was not present. Instead, as discussed 
above, the minor only had the right to have her views made known to 
57 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 78.
58 AC, supra note 2.
59 There were three sets of reasons in AC (supra note 2). Justice Abella wrote the 
majority judgment, for herself and three other judges, and upheld the regime 
as lawful. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rothstein concurred in the re-
sult. Both Justice Abella and Chief Justice McLachlin found the regime to be 
constitutionally sound. However, Justice Abella found that the common law 
continued to play a role, a conclusion which Chief Justice McLachlin rejected. 
Justice Abella and Chief Justice McLachlin also had different findings on ele-
ments of the Charter analysis. Justice Binnie wrote in dissent and found the 
regime violated the Charter. For discussion of these reasons, see Shawn HE 
Harmon, “Body Blow: Mature Minors and the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
Decision in AC v Manitoba” (2010) 4:1 McGill JL & Health 83. The approach 
to autonomy which the court endorsed has also attracted considerable criti-
cism. Alternatives, such as supported decision making, have been presented as 
preferable approaches. See e.g. Mona Paré, “Of Minors and the Mentally Ill: 
Re-Positioning Perspectives on Consent to Health Care” (2011) 29:1 Windsor 
YB Access Just 107.
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the decision-maker.60 The family argued that their child’s refusal to con-
sent to treatment ought to be definitive. In particular, they argued that the 
child’s Charter rights to equality,61 life, liberty, security of the person,62 
and to religious freedom63 were violated by the legislation because they 
claimed it effectively created “an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity.”64 
Early in her reasons, the trial judge in Carter v Canada (AG) (Carter 
BCSC), Justice Smith, reflected on how the legal questions that she had to 
decide were similar to those that were considered in AC and adopted its 
language. She wrote: 
[In AC Justice Abella] framed the issue in a way that echoes 
the issue in the case before me (at para 30):
The question is whether the statutory regime 
strikes a constitutional balance between what 
the law has consistently seen as an individual’s 
fundamental right to autonomous decision 
making in connection with his or her body and 
the law’s equally persistent attempts to protect 
vulnerable children from harm.65
Justice Smith returned to AC throughout her analysis. She ultimately drew 
many of her conclusions, which were subsequently adopted by the Supreme 
Court, from AC, as well as from other cases that discussed the conditions 
under which minors could refuse life-saving treatment.66
As noted above, both these decisions concerned regimes enacted to ad-
dress decision-making contexts where the subject of the decision may be 
vulnerable and where that vulnerability required considering whether or 
60 Child and Family Services Act, supra note 46, ss 2(2)–(3). 
61 Charter, supra note 3, s 15.
62 Ibid, s 7.
63 Ibid, s 2(a).
64 AC, supra note 2 at para 25.
65 Carter BCSC, supra note 13 at para 962, citing AC, supra note 2 at para 30. 
66 See e.g. AC, supra note 2, was cited in Carter BCSC, supra note 13 at paras 
218, 955–56, 958–70, 1234, 1298, 1300–03, 1350. 
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how protections may be required. In AC, the relevant vulnerability is that 
which is presumed to be inherent to childhood and which is also presumed 
to gradually dissipate with the development of maturity. In Carter SCC, 
the relevant vulnerability is characterized as a “time of weakness” that a 
suffering person may experience. In each case, the conclusion about Char-
ter compliance turned on whether the regime recognized that vulnerability 
may not, in fact, be present in the circumstances, or alternatively that a level 
of vulnerability does not necessarily undermine autonomous decisional cap-
acity. 
To look at the cases more closely, both AC and Carter SCC considered 
how an individual’s Section 7 rights67 were impacted upon by the regime in 
question. In Carter SCC, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the right 
to life was engaged because “the prohibition on physician-assisted dying 
had the effect of forcing some individuals to take their own lives premature-
ly, for fear they would be incapable of doing so when they reached the point 
where suffering was intolerable.”68 Justice Abella did not discuss the right 
to life in AC. But the reasoning in Carter SCC is on its face compelling with 
regard to mature minors. It is entirely conceivable that a 16-year-old may 
choose to commit suicide “prematurely” rather than face living with a med-
ical condition that has become intolerable to them past the moment when 
they still have the power to take their own life. Both decisions do discuss 
the right to liberty and security of the person. In AC, the court considered 
minors’ interests in liberty and security of the person and found that these 
interests were implicated by orders imposing treatment against the wishes 
of a minor. The court found that such orders denied minors the ability to de-
termine their own medical treatment, thereby depriving them of their rights 
as guaranteed under the Charter.69
Revisiting these Charter rights in Carter SCC, the court observed that 
these rights are underwritten by a concern for “individual autonomy and 
dignity.”70 The court affirmed that security of the person encompasses “a 
notion of personal autonomy involving … control over one’s bodily integ-
67 Charter, supra note 3, s 7. Section 7 protects the rights to “life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accord-
ance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
68 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 57.
69 AC, supra note 2 at para 102.
70 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 64.
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rity free from state interference”71 and that “it is engaged by state inter-
ference with an individual’s physical or psychological integrity, including 
any state action that causes physical or serious psychological suffering.”72 
As to liberty, they defined this interest as “the right to make fundamental 
personal choices free from state interference.”73 The court in Carter SCC 
analyzed the right to liberty and security of the person together, finding that 
the prohibition interfered with individuals’ “ability to make decisions con-
cerning their bodily integrity and medical care and thus trenches on liberty. 
And, by leaving people … to endure intolerable suffering, it impinges on 
their security of the person.”74 In its summative comments on autonomy, 
the Carter SCC court essentially found that the reasoning in AC, which sup-
ported mature minors having the right to refuse treatment, also determined 
its conclusions about the claimed right of the individual plaintiffs to choose 
physician-assisted death: 
In A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 
... a majority of this Court, per Abella J. (the dissent not dis-
agreeing on this point), endorsed the “tenacious relevance in 
our legal system of the principle that competent individuals 
are – and should be – free to make decisions about their bod-
ily integrity” (para. 39). This right to “decide one’s own fate” 
entitles adults to direct the course of their own medical care 
(para. 40): it is this principle that underlies the concept of “in-
formed consent” and is protected by s. 7’s guarantee of liberty 
and security of the person.75 
Given Carter SCC’s reasoning, and the findings in AC, it is likely that a 
physician-assisted death regime that completely excludes mature minors, 
without regard to their actual circumstances, will impair their Section 7 
rights. 
71 Ibid, citing Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519 at 587–88, 
[1993] SCJ No 94.
72 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 64.
73 Ibid, citing Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 
SCC 44 at para 50, [2000] 2 SCR 307, citing R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 
30 at 166, 44 DLR (4th) 385, Wilson J. 
74 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 66.
75 Ibid at para 67.
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Laws that infringe on life, liberty, or security of the person will stand if 
they are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice, which include 
the principle that a law should not being arbitrary.76 The court in Carter SCC 
found that a total ban on assisted death was not arbitrary because there was 
a rational connection between the legal prohibition and its object, to protect 
the vulnerable from ending their lives in times of weakness.77 If the question 
with regard to mature minors is framed as whether it is arbitrary to assume 
that a continued prohibition on assisted death will protect them, then, like 
the discussion in Carter SCC about adults, the answer must be no. However, 
if the question is whether it is arbitrary to assume that a mature minor can 
never have the capacity to make a medical treatment decision that adults 
have the capacity to make, then the answer must be yes. As discussed above, 
mature minors are defined by a finding that they have this very capacity 
vis-à-vis the specific decision at issue in any given instance. In AC the court 
affirmed that a regime which ignored this fact would be arbitrary: 
Given the significance we attach to bodily integrity, it would 
be arbitrary to assume that no one under the age of 16 has cap-
acity to make medical treatment decisions. It is not, however, 
arbitrary to give them the opportunity to prove that they have 
sufficient maturity to do so.78 
The finding that the legislative regime in AC did in fact provide an op-
portunity to prove capacity was pivotal for determining that although the 
regime violated a minor’s Section 7 rights to liberty and security of the 
person, it was nonetheless compliant with Section 7.
76 The principles of fundamental justice are also offended if a law is overbroad 
or has consequences that are grossly disproportionate. The decision in Carter 
SCC turned on the prohibition being overbroad, and taking “away rights in a 
way that … goes too far by denying the rights of some individuals in a way 
that bears no relation to its object” (Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 85). In 
particular, the prohibition was overbroad because it caught people who are not, 
in fact, vulnerable, but rather seeking to exercise an autonomous and informed 
choice. Overbreadth was not considered in AC (supra note 2) – but one would 
expect a similar assessment. In principle, an age restriction results in minors 
who are capable and can consent being treated as incapable and lacking cap-
acity. The court in Carter SCC also briefly discussed the principle of gross 
disproportionality but did not reach a conclusion on that issue (ibid at paras 
89–90).
77 Ibid at 83–84. 
78 AC, supra note 2 at para 107.
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In her analysis, Justice Abella found that the potential for vulnerability, 
in the form of lack of maturity, justified the state holding a power to assess 
life decisions for their alignment with the child’s best interests:
[T]he ineffability inherent in the concept of “maturity” … jus-
tifies the state’s retaining an overarching power to determine 
whether allowing the child to exercise his or her autonomy in 
a given situation actually accords with his or her best inter-
ests.79
However, the protective legislative regime at issue in AC was nuanced by 
the fact that it did not create an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity. Rath-
er, Justice Abella found it required an inquiry into maturity, with the over-
arching power of the state to act without the consent of the minor fading in 
light of growing maturity, even where the minor is refusing life-sustaining 
treatment. On this point, Justice Abella wrote:
The more a court is satisfied that a child is capable of making 
a mature, independent decision on his or her own behalf, the 
greater the weight that will be given to his or her views when 
a court is exercising its discretion under [the legislation]. … If 
… the court is persuaded that the necessary level of maturity 
exists, it seems to me necessarily to follow that the adoles-
cent’s views ought to be respected.80
In other words, the minor’s Charter rights were respected because the 
regime did not create an absolute bar to their treatment wishes being re-
spected. Rather, it required an assessment on the facts and recognized the 
possibility of finding that in individual cases a child may be found to have 
the decisional rights of a competent adult due to having mature decisional 
capacity. This set of facts also supported the court’s conclusion that the re-
gime’s reliance on age did not violate Section 15 – because capacity, not 
age, was the true determinant of whether the child would have the right to 
make their own treatment decision.81 
79 Ibid at para 86.
80 Ibid at para 87. 
81 The court in AC, ibid, considered whether the reference to age offended Sec-
tion 15, the equality provisions of the Charter. The court found Section 15 was 
not offended. Although noting that the presumption as to a distinction between 
“promoting autonomy and protecting welfare” is presumed to collapse at age 
16, in all cases weight will be allocated to a child’s views in accordance with 
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In summarizing her reasons, Justice Abella commented that “[a] rigid 
statutory distinction that completely ignored the actual decision-making ca-
pabilities of children under a certain age would fail to reflect the realities 
of childhood and child development.”82 To place a stark red line between 
adults and minors with regard to physician-assisted dying would clash with 
the very reasons our approaches to mature minors and medical-decisional 
capacity are Charter-compliant. The court’s reasons in AC, coupled with 
those in Carter SCC, would seem to support extending the regime which 
operationalizes the declaration in Carter SCC to mature minors, or risk be-
ing found unconstitutionally arbitrary.
In AC there was no Charter violation, and so there was no Section 1 
analysis. This differs from Carter SCC, where because the provision in 
question was found to violate Section 7 rights and be inconsistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice because the Criminal Code did not pro-
vide an opportunity to rebut the presumption of vulnerability, the court had 
to consider whether the violation was justified by the government.83 The 
Supreme Court shaped its discussion on Section 1 as an answer to the fol-
lowing question:
[W]hether a regime less restrictive of life, liberty and security 
of the person could address the risks associated with phys-
ician-assisted dying, or whether Canada was right to say that 
the risks could not adequately be addressed through the use of 
safeguards.84
a court’s conclusions about the child’s maturity and capacity. Justice Abella 
writes: “their ability to make treatment decisions is ultimately calibrated in ac-
cordance with maturity, not age, and no disadvantaging prejudice or stereotype 
based on age can be said to be engaged” (ibid at para 111).
82 Ibid at para 116.
83 As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter SCC, the Section 1 justi-
fication analysis centrally asks the following questions about an impugned re-
gime: “In order to justify the infringement of the appellants’ s. 7 rights under s. 
1 of the Charter, Canada must show that the law has a pressing and substantial 
object and that the means chosen are proportional to that object. A law is pro-
portionate if (1) the means adopted are rationally connected to that objective; 
(2) it is minimally impairing of the right in question; and (3) there is propor-
tionality between the deleterious and salutary effects of the law: R. v. Oakes, 
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103” (supra note 1 at para 94).
84 Ibid at para 103.
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This is a re-phrasing of how the trial judge in Carter BCSC positioned the 
issue. She stated, more generally, that the “real question is whether a pro-
hibition with exceptions would, in practical application, place patients at 
risk because of the difficulty in designing and applying the exceptions.”85 It 
is hard to imagine that this question would not be asked if a challenge was 
brought regarding mature minors. One would expect that this issue would 
sit at the heart of public concerns.
This portion of Carter SCC is particularly interesting for considering 
the situation of mature minors, as the Supreme Court of Canada answered 
this question with reference to its reasoning and findings in AC. In particu-
lar, AC was relied upon to illustrate that safeguards can be designed and 
implemented to protect those who ask for physician-assisted death and who 
are potentially vulnerable:
As the trial judge noted, the individual assessment of vulner-
ability (whatever its source) is implicitly condoned for life-
and-death decision making in Canada. In some cases, these 
decisions are governed by advance directives, or made by a 
substitute decision-maker. Canada does not argue that the risk 
in those circumstances requires an absolute prohibition (in-
deed, there is currently no federal regulation of such practi-
ces). In A.C., Abella J. adverted to the potential vulnerability 
of adolescents who are faced with life-and-death decisions 
about medical treatment (paras. 72–78). Yet, this Court im-
plicitly accepted the viability of an individual assessment of 
decisional capacity in the context of that case. We accept the 
trial judge’s conclusion that it is possible for physicians, with 
due care and attention to the seriousness of the decision in-
volved, to adequately assess decisional capacity.86
In short, it was the court’s confidence that physicians can assess adolescent 
decisional capacity in the context of life-and-death decisions that gave the 
court confidence that physicians can assess adult decisional capacity to con-
sent to physician-assisted dying.87 It follows that we should have confidence 
that our tests for adolescents will also capture their capacity in this context. 
85 Carter BCSC, supra note 13 at para 1235.
86 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 116.
87 Justice Abella wrote in AC, supra note 2 at para 78: “the factors that may affect 
an adolescent’s ability to exercise independent, mature judgement in making 
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v. the Question of safeguards: practices and experiences in 
BelgiuM and the netherlands
The Section 1 analysis in Carter SCC, which focuses on proportion-
ality and what was necessary to protect the vulnerable, turned in part on 
evidence concerning how other regimes address risks and concerns about 
vulnerability associated with physician-assisted death. Based on this evi-
dence, both the trial judge and the Supreme Court concluded that it was pos-
sible to limit the risks “through a carefully designed and monitored system 
of safeguards.”88 The Supreme Court, of course, left it to policy-makers to 
determine what this system would look like. 
In the context of mature minors’ capacity to consent, Courts and med-
ical treatment teams have already recognized that when considering the 
weight to be placed on a mature minor’s request “the degree of scrutiny will 
inevitably be most intense in cases where a treatment decision is likely to 
seriously endanger a child’s life or health.”89 However, it may be that fur-
ther and specific protocols, safeguards, or terms for evaluating requests for 
medical aid in dying from mature minors are appropriate. This issue should 
certainly be discussed and considered if provinces and the federal govern-
ment include mature minors in physician-assisted dying regimes. While the 
Expert Panel suggested that the same regime that is used for adults should 
be used for minors, the Québec Commission suggested that the rules for 
consent for minors should be supplemented by rules that take the specific 
and irreversible nature of medical aid in dying into account.90 
Both Belgium and the Netherlands, where minors are included in 
a physician-assisted dying regime, have chosen routes which align more 
closely with the Commission’s suggested approach. Belgium’s regime did 
not originally extend to minors. Its 2002 legislation, which legalized eutha-
nasia where the patient was experiencing a “hopeless medical condition and 
complains of constant and unbearable physical or mental pain that cannot be 
relieved and is the result of a serious and incurable accidental or pathologic-
maximally autonomous choices are numerous, complex, and difficult to enum-
erate with any precision” [emphasis in original].
88 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 117.
89 AC, supra note 2 at para 86.
90 Mémoire, Project de Loi No 52, supra note 25 at 22. 
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al condition,”91 required patients to be of the age of majority in Belgium, 18, 
or an “emancipated minor.”92 
In 2014, Belgium amended its law to extend the exception to minors. 
It removed all reference to age, and instead made “the capacity for discern-
ment” (la capacité de discernement) the key threshold for minors.93 Belgium 
adopted this amendment, in part,94 because age was seen “as less important 
than the capacity for discernment” and a recognition that this capacity “var-
91 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Belgian Euthanasia Law: A Critical Analysis” 
(2009) 35 J Med Ethics 436 at 438 [emphasis in original].
92 Ibid. See Loi relative à l’euthanasie, Moniteur Belge [MB], 22 June 2012, 
28515 [Loi euthanasie]. An unofficial version of this original legislation is 
available online: Dalhousie Health Law Institute <eol.law.dal.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/Belgian-Euthanasia-Act.pdf>. For an unofficial translation of 
the legislation into English, see Dale Kidd, “The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of 
May 28th 2002” (2002) 9:2-3 Ethical Perspectives 182. The term “emancipated 
minor” is not defined in the legislation. The term was described to Raphael 
Cohen-Almagor as intended to refer to “boundary cases of 16-17 year-old pa-
tients” and to “an autonomous person capable of making decisions” (Cohen-
Almagor, supra note 91 at 437). Others have asserted that the term only re-
ferred to “minors who are independent of their parents (e.g. due to marriage)” 
and thus “does not apply to other ‘mature minors’ between the ages of twelve 
and eighteen.” See Wayne Sumner, Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics and Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) at 157. Given changes to the legislative re-
gime in 2014, the question of the proper interpretation of the term has been 
rendered moot.
93 Loi euthanasie, supra note 92, art 3(1), as amended by Loi modifiant la loi 
du 28 mai 2002 relative à l’euthanasie, en vue d’étendre l’euthanasie aux 
mineurs, Moniteur Belge [MB], 22 February 2014, 21053. An unofficial Eng-
lish translation is available online: Dalhousie Health Law Institute <eol.law.
dal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Law-of-28-May-2002-on-Euthanasia-as-
amended-by-the-Law-of-13-February-2014.pdf>.
94 Other key factors for not restricting minors’ access to euthanasia in controlled 
circumstances include strong public and physician support: Andrew M Siegel, 
Dominic A Sisti & Arthur L Caplan, “Pediatric Euthanasia in Belgium: Dis-
turbing Developments” (2014) 311:19 JAMA 1963 at 1963. A 2011 survey 
found that 69.4% of Belgium physicians supported extending the then current 
law on euthanasia to minors: Geert Pousset et al, “Attitudes and Practices of 
Physicians Regarding Physician-Assisted Dying in Minors” (2011) 96:10 Arch 
Dis Child 948 at 950.
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ies widely with children.”95 This change brought their medical aid in dying 
laws in line with their existing consent legislation, which turns on a factual 
assessment of capacity.96 
While all children with decisional capacity can consent to euthanasia, 
one safeguard is that their decision is not determinative as parental consent 
is also required. Describing the criteria of the 2014 amendment, Bernard 
Dan et al write:
This bill rests on the same fundamentals as the 2002 Act on 
Euthanasia, including specifics of the request, responsibility 
of the physician, and the notions of serious and incurable dis-
order, hopeless situation, and unbearable suffering. Although 
it extends its application to children, it restricts its scope by 
excluding psychiatric disorders and, more importantly, by 
specifically addressing the issue of capacity for discernment, 
which should be assessed carefully by a multidisciplinary 
pediatric team, including a clinical psychologist. The parents 
must agree to the request.97
Thus, this regime recognizes the family as the decision-making unit. As 
well, the whole regime was passed in conjunction with legislation that “pro-
vided the basis for a steep increase in the means that were already available 
for palliative care,”98 as one of their measures to reduce risk and address 
vulnerability. 
Legislation authorizing physician-assisted death in the Netherlands, on 
the other hand, was crafted to address requests from minors from the start. 
The 2002 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Pro-
95 Dan, Fonteyne & de Cléty, supra note 15 at 671 [footnotes omitted].
96 Article 12 of the Loi relative aux droits du patient, Moniteur Belge [MB], 26 
September 2002, 43719 grants minors “‘who are deemed to be capable of rea-
sonable judgment of their needs’ the right to exercise their patient rights au-
tonomously, independently of chronological age.” See Pousset, supra note 94 
at 952. 
97 Dan, Fonteyne & de Cléty, supra note 15 at 672.
98 Cohen-Almagor, supra note 91 at 437.
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cedures) Act has some terms that apply whenever a physician receives a re-
quest, and additional terms that apply when the request is made by a minor.99 
In all cases, the legislation permits physicians to agree to grant requests 
for assisted death in circumstance of “due care.” The “due care” criteria 
include the patient being convinced there is no other reasonable solution 
for him or her, the physician being convinced that the request is voluntary 
and well-considered, and that the patient’s suffering is lasting and unbear-
able. The physician must also have informed the patient about his or her 
options, and an independent written opinion must be obtained from another 
physician, where that second physician has seen the patient and agrees that 
the above criteria are met.100  The granting physician must report on how the 
due care criteria were met, and the report is in turn evaluated by a Regional 
Euthanasia Review Committee. If the Committee is of the opinion that the 
due care criteria were not met, the file is referred to the Healthcare Inspector-
ate and the Public Prosecution Service, who may prosecute the physician.101
Additional requirements arise when the requesting individual is a min-
or. These requirements are calibrated by age and mirror Dutch laws on a 
minor’s consent to medical treatment.102 In particular, older minors who are 
17 and 18 years of age can independently request assisted death, but their 
parents are required to be consulted about and involved in the decision-
99 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
(entered into force April 2002), art 2.
100 André Janssen, “The New Regulation of Voluntary Euthanasia and Medic-
ally Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands” (2002) 16:2 Intl JL Pol’y & Fam 
260 at 262–63. See also Government of the Netherlands, “Is Euthanasia Al-
lowed?” (14 February 2016), online: <www.government.nl/issues/euthanasia/
is-euthanasia-allowed>. For a detailed description of how the due care criteria 
are interpreted, see Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, “Annual Report 
2011” (August 2012) at 8–26. An English translation of the Dutch law can be 
found at World Federation of Right to Die Societies, “Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act”, online: <www.eut 
anasia.ws/documentos/Leyes/Internacional/Holanda%20Ley%202002.pdf>.
101 Government of the Netherlands, “Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide and Non-Re-
suscitation on Request” (14 February 2016), online: <www.government.nl/
issues/euthanasia/euthanasia-assisted-suicide-and-non-resuscitation-on-re-
quest>. For a more detailed description of the process for reviewing reports, 
see Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, supra note 100 at 27–28. 
102 Janssen, supra note 100 at 265.
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making process.103 For younger minors, the legislation is similar to that in 
Belgium, and while children who are 12 to 16 years of age can request as-
sisted death, their parents must also consent to the request.104 
The legislation also makes the physician responsible for the ultimate de-
cision about whether to grant the request.105 Intriguingly, a survey of pediat-
ric physicians working in specializations where the majority of child deaths 
occur (oncology, hematology, intensivists and neurologists) found that while 
62% had received requests for physician-assisted dying, only 24% had ever 
granted such a request.106  Unfortunately the publication describing the sur-
vey results did not provide the reasons why the requests were not granted, 
so it is not clear, for example, whether the decision turned on a capacity 
assessment, medical criteria not being met, or the physician concluding that 
there were other reasonable options. Another study has found that, although 
only consultation is required by the legislation, in practice physicians are 
less likely to grant requests from older minors without parental consent.107 
Overall, while Dutch minors can initiate the decision-making process, it ap-
pears that their family and the whole treatment team are robust participants 
in such decisions. In many ways, this model is closer to a supported deci-
sion-making model, which some have argued ought to be generally adopted 
103 Ibid.
104 The legislation does not extend to children under 12 years of age. Vrakking et 
al, “Medical End-of-Life Decisions”, supra note 19 at 803. According to recent 
interviews reported in the Daily Telegraph, the Dutch Paediatric Association 
objects to the age-based approach. The Association’s ethics committee is pe-
titioning for a commission to be struck to consider an approach under which 
“[e]ach child’s ability to ask to die [is] evaluated on a case-by-case basis” ac-
cording to Eduard Verhagen, a member of the ethics committee and profes-
sor of paediatrics at Groningen University, as cited in Justin Huggler, “Give 
Children under 12 the Right to Die, Say Dutch Paediatricians”, The Telegraph 
(19 June 2015), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/nether 
lands/11686716/Give-children-under-12-the-right-to-die-say-Dutch-paediatric 
ians.html>.
105 Vrakking et al, “Medical End-of-Life Decisions”, supra note 19 at 807. Vrak-
king et al explain that this is pursuant to the Dutch Medical Treatment Act 
(1995).
106 Vrakking et al, “Medical End-of-Life Decisions”, supra note 19 at 807.
107 Ibid at 807, citing Astrid M Vrakking et al, “Physicians’ Willingness to Grant 
Requests for Assistance in Dying for Children: A Study of Hypothetical Cases” 
(2005) 146:5 J Pediatr 611 at 611–17.
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in Canada for minors. Mona Paré, for example, suggests such approaches 
are better at respecting the protection needs and autonomy rights of minors 
than our current approach to consent and capacity, because they engage the 
circle of care.108 
If Canada chooses to include minors in a physician-assisted dying re-
gime, which legally I believe we must, the regimes in Belgium and the Neth-
erlands offer us some models to consider when assessing whether additional 
safeguards should be in place when requests come from minors. They also 
identify some issues that we must address in our conversations about minors 
and physician-assisted death. These include the roles for family members 
and treatment teams in end-of-life decisions, as well as the need to pay 
attention to the adequacy of palliative care. The Netherlands model is also 
provocative in that while a request must be made by the minor, the state 
continues to assert a protective role and the ultimate decision does not rest 
with the minor but with a physician.
conclusion
This article has not engaged with many of the spectres that hover around 
discussions of medical aid in dying. It has not, for example, considered the 
adequacy of the funding of pediatric palliative care and the quality of hos-
pice care for minors in Canada. Any deficiency in these factors ought not 
to play a role in any request for physician-assisted death in Canada. This 
article has also not suggested how provinces ought to go about addressing 
the outstanding matter of bringing clarity and consistency to the law regard-
ing mature minors and medical decision making generally. It has instead 
focused on the general and consistent principles in this area, which force us 
to recognize that we need to grapple with how minors are to be included in 
Canada’s medical aid in dying regime. 
This article calls out for a lot of work. It calls upon the public and policy 
makers to engage with the fact that minors will request physician-assisted 
death, and to think through the best answers to such a request. At the mo-
ment, the range of responses seems to include telling a minor who is 17 
years and 10 months old to make a choice between either waiting it out 
for two months and hoping that they do not lose capacity during that time 
period, or else choosing to have their feeding tube removed and starving to 
108 Paré, supra note 59.
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death while heavily sedated. Another choice is to tell a family that they can 
serve as a litigation test case that will likely last far longer than the life of 
their child. These responses are not satisfactory, and they do a disservice to 
our youth.
This conversation requires engagement with what the law demands, 
with close attention and honesty about the impact and consequences of our 
decisions. The analysis above, of Carter SCC and AC, indicates that the 
complete exclusion of minors from a physician-assisted death regime will 
likely fall if challenged under Section 7. The focus of the discussion mov-
ing forward should be to identify the terms under which our legal regime is 
clearly Charter-compliant, and under which there is public confidence that 
protections are in place where vulnerability is present.
